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Slouching Toward Eurasia?
By ILAN BERMAN(1) 
Since Vladimir Putin's assumption of the Russian presidency in December of 1999, 
Moscow's foreign policy has changed course. The norm is no longer President Yel'tsin's 
sometimes halting embrace of Europe and the West, which persisted in spite of 
pressures both from hard-liners within his own government (such as Foreign Minister -- 
and later Prime Minister -- Yevgeny Primakov) and from the secret police and 
intelligence organs. Instead, under Putin's direction, Russia's manipulation of foreign 
affairs -- despite fluctuations in tone -- generally appears to be more aggressive and 
"geopolitical," raising worries about renewed imperial aspirations on the part of the 
Kremlin.
The post-1999 foreign policy approach is based on an ideological infrastructure. Long 
relegated to ultranationalists and a handful of "new right" thinkers, the previously 
obscure doctrine of Eurasianism has emerged as a major force in Russian politics. It is 
noteworthy not only for its appeal as the basis for a renewed quest for national 
greatness, but also for the degree to which its tenets appear to have begun to animate 
many of President Putin's international maneuvers.
Eurasianism's renaissance is not surprising. Its early 20th-century concepts -- 
advocating the cultural and political struggle between the West and a distinct Russia-led 
"Eurasian" subcontinent -- were, in their day, championed by such prominent Russian 
political figures as Count Nikolai Trubetskoi and later Lev Gumilev. In recent years, the 
noticeable reversion to "new right" balance-of-power politics that has taken place 
among the Russian policy-making elite has breathed new life into the movement. 
Indeed, by all indications, growing emphasis on geopolitics from all corners of the 
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Russian political spectrum is rapidly elevating Eurasianism to the level of a mainstream 
ideology.
A great deal of this newfound appeal can be attributed to Eurasianism's main ideologue 
-- Alexandr Dugin. Despite his checkered past (a former member of the radical anti-
Semitic Pamyat' organization and later of the racist Conservative Revolution, alongside 
controversial writer/opposition figure Eduard Limonov), Dugin is now viewed as Russia's 
premier geopolitician. He serves as international affairs adviser to a number of senior 
Russian parliamentarians, including the communist-"patriotic" Duma speaker Gennady 
Seleznev, as well as to high-ranking officials in Russian defense and foreign policy 
circles. (2) His writings on strategy reportedly have had profound influence not only on 
Communist Party leader Gennady Zuganov, but on members of the Russian General 
Staff as well.
Dugin's leading work, Osnovi Geopolitiki: Geopolitichiskoye Budushiye Rossiyi (The 
Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia), serves as the 
cornerstone of the new Eurasianism. In it, he articulates the tenets of his revised, 
updated version turn-of-the-century balance-of-power politics:
'LAND' VS. 'SEA' POWERS -- Adopting traditional theories from such strategists as 
Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Halford Mackinder, Dugin postulates a struggle for 
international dominance between "land" powers (embodied by Russia) and "sea" 
powers (principally the United States and the United Kingdom). This is compounded by 
the globalist "Atlanticism" of these countries, which is incompatible with, and 
antagonistic to, a sense of Russia's "Eurasian" distinctness. As a result, Dugin believes 
that "the strategic interests of the Russian people must be oriented in an anti-Western 
fashion (deriving from the imperative to preserve the identity of Russia's 
civilization)." (3 )
EMPIRE AS DESTINY -- The creation of a Russia-dominated Eurasian space, 
stretching from the Levant to the Asia-Pacific, is central to Dugin's theory. According to 
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him, the Russian people are ethnically, culturally, psychologically, religiously and, above 
all, historically destined to recreate Russian greatness, which is not fulfilled today by 
ephemeral constructs like the CIS and the Russian Federation. In short, Russia "cannot 
exist outside of its essence as an empire, by its geographical situation, historical path 
and fate of the state." (4)
ALLIANCE BUILDING -- Given Russia's current diminished international stature, Dugin 
stresses the need for alliance building as a tool for political and economic dominance. 
These alignments, based on the common "rejection of Atlanticism, strategic control of 
the USA, and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us," can serve as the basis 
for a "political and strategic union" with other like-minded nations.(5 )Accordingly, in the 
Middle East, Dugin stresses the importance of a Moscow-Tehran axis and the creation 
of a zone of Iranian influence to which regimes in the region will gravitate. In Europe, he 
advocates a Moscow-Berlin pivot, which he sees as essential to the creation of a cordon 
sanitaire against Western influence in the former Soviet bloc. And in Asia, he speaks of 
a Moscow-Tokyo axis as necessary for the creation of a "pan-Asiatic" alliance to offset 
geostrategic competitors such as China in the long term. In Russia's present, weakened 
state, according to Dugin, such unions will serve to fulfill Moscow's ambitions by 
creating "an empire of many empires." (6)
Not surprisingly, this ambitious invocation of Derzhavnost,(7) the idea of Russia as a 
Great Power, has resonated among Russians discontented with their country's 
diminished international status. Nothing illustrates this more than the runaway popularity 
of Dugin's newly established "Eurasia" movement. The fledgling political initiative, unlike 
previous (failed) far right offshoots, boasts the broadest spectrum of political/religious 
affiliations under one umbrella in more than a decade. (8) In addition to prominent 
politicians and former KGB operatives, the movement has become home to members of 
the spiritual leadership of the Russian Orthodox and other religious communities.
Eurasianism also has rapidly gained currency among the Russian foreign policy 
establishment. Affiliates of the movement include such prominent figures as Dmitri 
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Riurikov, a former foreign affairs adviser to President Yel'tsin and currently Moscow's 
ambassador to Uzbekistan, and General Nikolai Klokotov, former head of the General 
Staff's military training academy. (9) At a recent panel discussion, even experts from the 
influential Council for Foreign and Defense Policy officially concluded that Russia must 
adopt Eurasianism in order to prevent disintegration and reestablish its international 
status. (10)
Most significantly, however, Eurasianism's influence is increasingly evident in President 
Putin's conduct of foreign affairs. Since his rise to the presidency, the former KGB 
spymaster has echoed the concepts of "multipolarity" and geopolitics that were the 
hallmarks of his foreign policy predecessor -- Yevgeny Primakov. Notably, Primakov was 
in his day rumored to be an adherent of Eurasianism, although the KGB veteran never 
articulated this publicly. (11) With Putin, however, the influence of Dugin's concepts of 
Russia's international importance, "Eurasian" cultural distinctness, and economic-
political alliance building can clearly be felt. In a recent editorial, the president himself -- 
echoing Dugin's writings -- affirmed that "Russia has always seen itself as a Euro-
Asiatic nation." (12)
In turn, Dugin, a strident opponent of former President Boris Yel'tsin's efforts at 
globalization and Western integration, has lauded Putin's policies. His "Eurasia" 
movement, at its founding conference, articulated its "total support" for Putin's efforts, 
which Dugin has called a "shift in foreign policy direction" for Russia and a sign of its 
"new Eurasian politics." (13) Indeed, Dugin has much to praise -- a great many of 
President Putin's recent foreign policy initiatives appear to have been lifted directly from 
the strategist's playbook:
In Central Asia, Putin has come a long way toward resuscitating Russia's Cold War 
influence and cementing Moscow's position as the preeminent power in the "post-Soviet 
space." Responding to the security concerns of the fragile Central Asian republics, the 
Kremlin, along with the governments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and 
Tajikistan, established a regional "rapid reaction force" to counter local Islamist 
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insurgency in May of 2001. The task force, which will operate under Russian command, 
effectively places Moscow at the helm of security planning for much of Central Asia. 
(14 )
Likewise, building on Dugin's principle of economic interdependence, President Putin on 
June 1 officially launched his much-vaunted Eurasian Economic Community, which 
unifies many of the Central Asian republics in an oil-rich, Moscow-dominated economic 
alternative to the European Union. Finally, the nearly simultaneous transformation of the 
so-called "Shanghai Five" into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (with the addition 
of Uzbekistan) and the historic July Russia-China summit, at which the two countries 
signed a multi-decade "friendship and cooperation" accord, are indicative of Moscow's 
concerted efforts to create a new balance of power in Central Asia, one which excludes 
Western influence altogether. (15)
In the Middle East, in line with Dugin's recommendations, Putin has placed great 
emphasis on the strengthening of the Russo-Iranian strategic partnership. In March of 
2001, he and Iranian President Mohammed Khatami concluded a landmark cooperation 
agreement worth a reported $7 billion, signaling a new phase of strategic alignment 
between the two countries. (16) Iran, in turn, has grown in both power and influence, 
signing a defense accord with Saudi Arabia in April 2001 cementing its dominance in the 
Gulf, as well as exhibiting a renewed focus-- one mirroring Moscow's plans -- on the 
Caspian region. (17) 
Dugin's influence is also visible in Russia's recent rapprochement with Germany. Since 
his assumption of power, Berlin has become the centerpiece of President Putin's 
European policy. In the spring of 2001, he and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
held intensive talks regarding bilateral cooperation, prompting a dramatic warming of 
relations and Putin's declaration that "Germany is Russia's leading partner in Europe 
and the world." (18) Since then, Moscow has worked hard to cement Berlin's diplomatic 
and economic support, all the while promoting European dependency on Russian-
controlled Central Asian energy resources. These tactics have had concrete results: In a 
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recent article in the German Die Welt newspaper, Schröder praised both Russia's 
adherence to the "European community of values" and its "key role in the efforts for 
lasting security and stability in Europe." (19) 
Given the striking similarities between Eurasianism's postulates and many of Putin's 
policies, it is no wonder that Dugin has welcomed the president's maneuvers as "the 
start of a new, Eurasian direction" for Russia. (20) Of course, Russian foreign policy is 
both multifaceted and multidirectional, and may well evolve along a different path over 
time. There is no denying, however, that Eurasianism's tenets are rapidly gaining 
strength in the Kremlin's corridors of power. The extent of their influence on Russia's 
long-term foreign policy direction remains to be seen, but it is alarming that Putin 
apparently takes Dugin's dreams of Eurasian empire seriously enough to try to put 
some of them into practice.
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